By World on fire gy lindanoche Aexa6pp 2010 13 pagcs Searching For The Matchstick l. Introduction Amy Chua, a Law Professor at the University of Yale, in her book World on Fire, very eloquently asserts that the global spread of laissez-faire markets and ostensive democracy has became a key exasperatlng agent causing «group hatred and ethnic violence» (Chua, 2004: 9) in countries around the world, primarily in the Global South.
Chua asserts that economic liberalization allows «market-dominant minorities» (6) to accumulate disproportionate amounts of wealth, and influence compared o the rest of the native population, while political liberalization empowers the dispossessed «indigenous majorities» (6), who then use the power against the market-dominant minority. Chua therefore refutes the » owerful estern] assumption that markets and democr or 13 bluntly stated as the bt? f _ free market democra bree instability. To illustra studies, some of whi 3) and instead, ues that «exporting and global ites a series of cases ions, highlighting ethnically-targeted assaults in developing countries, such as the Philippines, Zimbabwe, and Venezuela, to name a few. Moreover, Chua blames the West, mainly the United States, for exporting a version of capitalism and democracy that they don’t practice themselves (14). As a result, Chua explains that as long as the West continues to push an extreme ideology onto the world, it Will continue to endure violence and instability.
Likewise, the book Swipe to vlew next page book World on Pire: How Free Market Democracy Breed Ethnic Hatred and Global Instabiliõy, boldly states that free markets and democracy are major instigators of political instability in the Global South. But is Chua’s assertion right and properly substantiated? Are free markets and democracy a major source of political instability? Her assertion lacks coherence and proper support. Chua has a fixated paradigm, where the bottom line is always ethnical, thus presenting a patchy argument.
There are other influencing factors at play surrounding the discussion, which need to be accounted for properly, such as: class structure, social organization, colonial history, role of the state, resource scarcity, and even cultural customs and beliefs. II. Summary Chua provides an alternative and compelling argument to conventional wisdom regarding the larger debate in the social ciences over the role of free markets and democracy in development in the Global South.
The mainstream View of development argues that a free market economy «hand in hand» (123) with democracy, provides mutual reinforcement, and thus are the key to rapid economic growth in the Global South. Free markets and free societies Will bring about peace, stability and development, through increased cooperation between states, between socioeconomic classes, and between people (Todaro & Smith, 2009). The counterargument, taking on a Marxist connotation, argues that a free market system by ature breeds inequality and causes economic fragmentation within society.
Moreover, the argument is that democracies are structured within and for the capitalist system, wher 2 3 the argument is that democracies are structured within and for the capitalist system, where politicians only advocate for the interests of the business and political elites. Therefore, free market democracies only facilitate economic exploitation and simp[y give the masses the false illusion that they are represented and integrated in the political economy; consequently, bringing about no fundamental development to the masses (Kurtz, 2004).
Chua broadens the discussion to include an ethnic nuance to the debate. In her book World on Fire, she posits that «the global spread of markets and democracy is a principal, aggravating cause of group hatred and ethnic violence» (Chua, 2004: 9), thus causing political instability, and consequently underdevelopment. She goes on to illustrate that around the world, «for widely varying reasons» (6), many states are not ethnically or culturally homogenous.
She explains that there may be Sharp ethnic, linguistic, religious and cultural divisions, which are aggravated by lobalization to the extent where groups may choose to engage in actively hostile behaviour towards each other. Therefore, «in the numerous societies around the world that have a market- dominant minority, markets and democracy are not mutually reinforcing’ (9). Why? She argues: because free markets mainly benefit an ethnic minority that already possess the wealth, business connections, and social capital, which under market conditions, Will tend to economically dominate the local poor majorities.
Discordantly, democracy empowers the ethnic majority, who then uses the political process to persecute the market-dominant m empowers the ethnic majority, who then uses the political process to persecute the market-dominant minorities, reclaiming the nations’ assets and identity (10). Chua starts by explaining the economic impact of globalization by illustrating that in contrast to the Western nations, the Global South is so ethnically divided that, as a result, within a free market democracy, some Will win but most Will lose.
Consequently, she goes on to list an array of developing countries that have been under the perpetual economic dominance of a relatively Small ethnic minority group. In Malaysia, she reports that the Chinese, the largest minority in Southeast Asia, representing about a third of the population, account for 70 percent of the country’s market capitalization» (36). Moreover, she cites that South Africa has a predominant White market-dominant minority, «including most predominantly the Oppenheimer family, who [has] historically controlled the country’s most lucrative industries» (98).
In grazil, she states, «less than 0. 01 percent ofthe country’s population… own most of the country’s land» (66). The political consequences of globalization are then illustrated, and Chua proceeds to explain that because the economic and olitical reforms pushed by the West fail to take into account ethnic division in the Global South, the product is repeated instability and violence, taking on one of three forms (125). «The first backlash is against markets» (127).
Ethnic majorities use their new-found political power to nationalize companies and enforce trade barriers as economic sanctions against the market- dominant minority. For exa 40F 13 and enforce trade barriers as economic sanctions against the market-dominant minority. For example, in Zimbabwe, President Robert Mugabe openly allowed violent takeovers of farms owned y the white mlnorlty (125). «The second backlash is against democracy» (147). Here, the market-dominant minorities in an effort to protect themselves against the enraged indigenous majority, support coups, and move towards crony capitalism.
As was the case in Sierra Leone, in 1971, when president Siaka Stevens formed an alliance with five renowned Lebanese diamond dealers in arder to «cash in on [the] country’s… diamond resource,» and invited Guinean troops «to outmanoeuvre his political rivals» (147). «The third backlash is against market- dominant minorities» (163). It is national «ethnic cleansinZ’ (125), s was the case, during the genocide in Rwanda in 1994. Hutus, which made up about 85% ofthe countrys population, slaughtered 800,000 Tutsis, who controlled the country (169).
Finally, Chua in her final chapter, Ethonationalism and the West, goes on to explain that this problematic relationship between free market democracies and ethnic division is not confined solely to the Global South, and that, in fact «this confrontation lurks beneath some of the most violent… episodes of Western historf(188). She then concludes her discussion with a series of recommendations on What should be done to rectify the issues t hand.
In the end, Chua supports free market democracy, and suggests that immediate democracy is not the best course of action, since it gives the indigenous majorities and opportunity to destabilize the situation, using s 3 action, since it gives the indigenous majorities and opportunity to destabilize the situation, using potentially violent methods of retaliation. Instead, she urges «the best hope for democratic capitalism in the non-Western world lies with market-dominant minorities themselves»(278), particularly by funding high-profile national symbols (285). III. Critical Commentary
World on Fire is a comprehensive, provocative, and very well written book. It undergoes a thoughtful discussion examining various aspects of ethnicity and globalization from an economic perspective and a political perspective. However, free markets and democracy are not the primary instigators of polltical instability in the Global South, as she claims. Chua, while acknowledging that there are other factors at play, most commonly colonial history or class structure, simply veers towards the opinion that the main variable around this phenomenon is ethnical division.
Accordingly, the author does not resent a unified theory in the end. To start, the market-dominant minorities, working together, often drive the economy and generate vast economic growth, bestowing great benefits on the majority (Todaro & Smith, 2009). However, Chua does not recognize this, instead she often deems their efforts as «corrupt arrangements» (Chua, 2004:1 58) and categorizes them as notorious cases of»crony capitalism» (1 58), as was the case in Indonesia.
She starts by explaining that under the rule of President Sukarno the country endured «economic stagnation and widespread bankruptcy» (151). Then she proceeds o undermine his successor, General Suharto, and his efforts 6 3 bankrup o/’ (151 Then she proceeds to undermine his successor, General Suharto, and his efforts and success to generate economic growth, because of his collaboration with the Indonesian Chinese business community (151). Chua seldom mentions the benefits that the market-dominant minority renders on a nation.
Instead, she more often centres on the misery ofthe ethnic majority, thus posing that the hatred of the rich minorities is justly vindicated, as is her argument. She continually states that they are left behind by economic reform in developing countries, ut does not present concrete evidence. «In Bolivia… where in the 1950s the revolutionary president Victor Paz Estenssoro extended universal suffrage and free education to the Amerindlans and conducted genuine, significant land reform – political power was never truly transferred to the country’s impoverished, largely illiterate indigenous majo ity. – (Chua, 2004: 159) Clearly the progress is not as fast or as widespread, but it is not the stark ethnic divide that Chua suggests. Subsequently, Chua strongly refutes the possibility’ that the conflicts between «market-dominant minorities» and «indigenous ajorities» are not along ethnic lines but rather a struggle between classes. For example, she states that «to suggest that the Arab-lsraeli struggle is principally about economic disparities would be both absurd and offensive»(212), only to imply exactly that in the pages that follow.
Class or rather socioeconomic status groups are a more fundamental phenomenon than ethnicity, when explaining mass uprising, due to exploitation and social exclusion, ag ethnicity, when explaining mass uprising, due to exploitation and social exclusion, against an elite few. For example, Argentina is nation that has adopted the Western ideals of a free market democracy (Kurtz, 2004), and a nation which does not have a market-dominant minority (Chua, 2004: 15). But nonetheless, it is a nation that has endured many of the struggles that Chua illustrates.
During the economic crisis between 1999 and 2002, Argentina endured much upheaval and political instability. Argentines, unsatisfied, protested and engaged in property destruction, commonly against banks and American multinational corporations (Kurtz 2004). Chua admits that the conflicts in Latin America are couched in terms of class before they are in terms of thnicity, but does so prudently (Chua, 2004:134). «Nationalization in Latin America was in a surprising number of cases fuelled by the desire to reclaim the wealth of the nation… Nevertheless, she does admit to the conclusion that in fact conflicts at the bottom are about class (Kurtz, 2004); instead she adds «… for its true, ethnically defined owners» (Chua, 2004: 134). For example, Venezuela’s President Hugo Chavez, proclaimed that «the right to food… was more important than corporate profit» (143), and «threatened to nationalize all banks,» in order to «grant credit to Small farmers and Small business» (143). Hugo Chavez advocated and worked for the working class (Kurtz, 2004), yet Chua deemed such policies as racist (Chua, 2004:143).
Moreover, throughout her discussion Chua leaves an integral variable out of the equation, the state. It is not until the final chapter, 13 Chua leaves an integral variable out of the equation, the state. It is not until the final chapter, that she elusively mentions the state. She goes on to blame political instability in the Global South on the international system and ethnic division. ‘Todays universal policy prescription for underdevelopment,» haped and promulgated to a large extent by the United States… Take the rawest form of capitalism… with the rawest from of democracy… and export the two as a package deal to the…
Add market-dominant minorities to the picture, and the instability inherent in the bareknuckle version of free market democracy is compounded a thousand fold by the manipulative forces of ethnic hatred. » – (Chua, 2004: 195) However, at no moment does she incorporate or mention the role ofthe state in the receiving country. It is important to examine the weaknesses of the outgoing political system, he factors that pushed the state towards political instability, and whether those factors are Still at play and continue to pose a problema Ifthe state fails to bring food to the table and ensure security to its people, it loses legitimacy.
This Will breed dissatisfaction, and thus, more incentive for the masses to rise up in protest and engage in violent action, resulting in political instability (Kurtz, 2004). Additionally, when Chua discusses possible resolutions, she completely discredits the capabilities and the role of the domestic state. She argues that countries in the Global South annot effectively establish social safety nets. She argues that constitutional safeguards and human right protection policies Will ultimate nets.
She argues that constitutional safeguards and human righ protection policles Will ultimately be «swept away by the very ethnonationalist risings they are intended to forestal'» (Chua, 2004:274). For example, during the 19505 and 1960s In Indonesia, President Sukarno, who was democratically elected, began to nationalize land and industries. This was done with constitutional and majority support, with the intention to ensure equitable wealth distribution in the nation.
However, Chua argues that ‘these nationalizations had nothing to with socialism» rather claims that they were clear ethnic attacks geared towards the market-dominant Dutch and Chinese in the country (132). Moreover, at the beginning of the book, Chua acknowledges that there are in fact vanous factors contributing to ethnic conflict and political instability in the Global South. However, she seldom abides by her statement. Instead, she often overlooks the «numerous overlapping factors and complex dynamics» (16), and rather manipulates cases to fit her thesis, as was the case with he Rwandan genocide.
Contrary to her claim that free markets empower market-dominant minorities, Chua goes on for several pages explaining the historical causes leading towards the Tutsis’ superiority over the Hutus (165). In the end however, she does this only to come to the conclusion that the main cause leading to the genocide was democracy, leaving history as a trivial instigator. She says, «[tlhe tragic case of Rwanda illustrates the most extreme form of majority-supported, democracy-assisted efforts to exterminate an economically dominant ethnic minoritY’ (165).
